How to Check Wind Farm SCADA and Communication in China: the IEC 61400-25 Stack (Information Models, Exchange Services, Mappings to MMS, IEC 60870-5-104, DNP3, OPC/XML-DA and Web Services) and GB/T 30966.1-2022 (Identical Adoption of Part 1 Only), NDRC Order No. 27 (2024) in Force Since 1 January 2025 and Repealing the 2014 Order No. 14 (Zones I–IV, One-Way Isolation Devices, Vertical Encryption, No Wireless Products in the Production Zone, New-Energy and Centralised Monitoring Expressly Covered), the 2022 Cybersecurity Measures, and NEA's 2023 Bans on Direct Internet Remote Control and Vendor Remote O&M

Short answer. A Chinese wind farm's SCADA and communication layer is checked against two families of text. The data family is IEC 61400-25: Part 1 describes a client-server architecture with three separately modelled areas — information models, an information exchange model, and the mapping of both to a communication profile; Part 2 names the logical nodes and data objects, harmonised with IEC 61850; Part 3 defines the abstract services for data access, control, event reporting and self-description; Part 4 maps them to SOAP web services, OPC/XML-DA, IEC 61850-8-1 MMS, IEC 60870-5-104 and DNP3. China adopted Part 1 identically as GB/T 30966.1-2022, whose record lists GB/T 30966.2-2022, 30966.3-2022 and 30966.4-2023 as the sister parts. The security family is now NDRC Order No. 27 of 2024, in force since 1 January 2025 and repealing the 2014 Order No. 14; it expressly names new-energy generation monitoring, storage-station monitoring, virtual-power-plant monitoring and centralised generation monitoring as power monitoring systems, and the dedicated network between a generator's centralised monitoring centre and its plants as a dedicated monitoring network. It requires zoned protection — a production control zone that may be split into security zones I and II and a management information zone that may be split into zones III and IV — a dedicated monitoring network with real-time and non-real-time subnets, and a security access area wherever production-zone modules reach terminals over public, wireless or other non-dedicated networks; power-specific one-way isolation between the production zone and the management and access areas, logical isolation inside, vertical encryption-authentication at the wide-area boundary, no general network services crossing the boundaries between the production zone and the management zone or the access area, and no wireless-function products in the production zone. The operator is responsible; the dispatch body reviews the security scheme and must consent to anything joining the dispatch data network, receives alarms in real time, supervises the grid-facing part and, where that supervision finds a major security risk in a supervised system that could lead to a cybersecurity incident, may disconnect its data-network or primary-equipment connection. NEA's 2022 measures add dispatch consent for grid-related security products, third-party testing before go-live and annual drills; its 2023 key requirements allow wind-farm internal control (among other listed businesses) to use wireless, but only with protections that stop end-point wireless links joining the dedicated control network directly, forbid remote control directly through the public internet, vendor remote O&M, insecure remote centralised control and forwarding of the dispatch telecontrol device's data to non-dispatch units, and require six months of logs. This guide reads abstracts, records and rules; it quotes no clause of GB/T 30966, GB/T 19963.1 or GB/T 36572 and no inspection record.

1. The data standards: what each part does

CNWattHub reading: when a turbine supplier says its SCADA is "IEC 61400-25 compliant", the four parts give four separate questions — which information model edition, which services, which mapping (MMS, 104 or DNP3 towards the grid; web services or OPC towards the owner's platform), and whether the Chinese GB/T 30966 series is cited in the contract. A compliance statement that names only the series does not tell you how the farm will talk to the dispatch centre; and the adoption relation is documented here only for Part 1.

2. The zoning and isolation rules: Order No. 27 (2024)

• Scope, principle and definitions. In force since 1 January 2025, repealing the 2014 Order No. 14. Applies to operators and their planning, design, R&D, manufacturing, construction and commissioning units. Principles: security zoning, dedicated networks, horizontal isolation, vertical authentication, reinforced by security immunity, situational awareness, dynamic assessment and backup/emergency measures. The definition of power monitoring systems lists new-energy generation monitoring, storage-station monitoring, virtual-power-plant monitoring and centralised generation monitoring; the dedicated network between a generator's centralised monitoring centre and its plants is a dedicated monitoring network.
• Zones. A production control zone, which may be divided into zones I and II, and a management information zone, which may be divided into zones III and IV; real-time monitoring and control of primary equipment goes to zone I, closely interacting non-control modules to at least zone II, operation-command and analysis to at least zone III, the rest to at least zone IV; zones may be simplified when overall security is met, but no vertical cross-connection between zones may be formed.
• Dedicated network. The production zone must use a dedicated monitoring network on dedicated channels with independent equipment, physically isolated from the operator's other networks and public networks, split into real-time and non-real-time subnets for zones I and II.
• Security access area. Required where production-zone modules talk to terminals over non-dedicated networks — public wired, wireless, the operator's other data networks — or where terminals lack physical access control.
• Devices. Power-specific one-way horizontal isolation between the production zone and both the management zone and the access area; logical isolation (access control, firewalls or equivalent) between zones I and II, between III and IV, and between the access area and its terminals; power-specific vertical encryption-authentication devices or gateways where the production zone meets the wide-area dedicated network; a certificate-based dispatch authentication mechanism with end-to-end application-layer encryption for important production-zone business.
• Prohibitions. No high-risk general network services and no products with wireless functions in the production zone, with peripheral access controlled; no general network services across the boundaries between the production zone and the management or access areas.
• Governance. The operator is the responsible party and its principal bears overall responsibility; the security scheme drawn up at planning stage is reviewed by the operator's monitoring-system cybersecurity department and the dispatch body, implemented before commissioning and accepted by that department; anything joining the dispatch data network needs the dispatch body's review and consent; alarms from systems on the dispatch data network go to the dispatcher in real time; the dispatch body supervises the grid-facing part of plants in its direct range and, where in that technical supervision it finds a major security risk in a supervised system that could lead to a cybersecurity incident, may disconnect the system's data-network or primary-equipment connection to control the risk; a cyber attack that causes abnormality or failure triggers the emergency plan and reports to the dispatch body and the local NEA office.

CNWattHub reading: the practical test of a wind farm's design is where each box sits — turbine controllers, the farm SCADA server, the power-forecast server, the condition-monitoring system, the owner's cloud gateway — against the zone map, and whether each boundary carries the device the order names for it: one-way isolation at the production-zone edge, logical isolation between the paired zones, encryption-authentication at the wide-area link. A condition-monitoring vendor that needs "a VPN to the turbines" is asking for a security access area behind a one-way device, not a firewall rule; and because the 2024 order now names centralised generation monitoring and the owner's dedicated centre-to-plant network explicitly, a developer's remote control centre is inside the regulation, not beside it.

3. What the 2022 measures and the 2023 key requirements add

CNWattHub reading: this guide singles out two of these bans for checking, the vendor one and the telecontrol one — a turbine OEM's "remote diagnostics" contract and a developer's own centralised-control centre both have to show how they reach the farm without a vendor controlling, regulating or maintaining the monitoring system and without the dispatch telecontrol device serving as the data source for anyone but the dispatcher. The 2023 key requirements predate Order No. 27 and still cite the 2014 order; the zoning they assume is now the 2024 text's.

4. A checklist built from the sources

1. Data model. Which IEC 61400-25 parts and editions, and which GB/T 30966 parts, the SCADA implements; which mapping faces the grid and which faces the owner.
2. Zone map. Every system placed in zone I, II, III, IV or the access area; one-way isolation at the production-zone edges, logical isolation between paired zones, encryption-authentication at the wide-area link.
3. Dispatch approvals. Dispatch-body review of the security scheme; consent for everything on the dispatch data network and for grid-related security products in the production zone; real-time alarm forwarding.
4. Wireless. Where farm-internal control uses wireless, the protective measures that stop end-point wireless links joining the dedicated control network directly; no wireless-function product in the production zone; non-dedicated links only through a security access area.
5. Remote access. No direct public-internet control; no vendor remote O&M; secure remote centralised control; the telecontrol device that communicates with the dispatcher not used to forward data to other, non-dispatch units.
6. Testing and drills. Third-party test before go-live; the evaluations required under national provisions; annual drills.
7. Logs. Six months retained.
8. Forecasting. Dispatch-side forecasting system requirements per GB/T 40607-2021.
9. Grid code. GB/T 19963.1-2021 cited for the onshore connection and its related dispatch standard.

Scope limits

This guide reads NDRC Order No. 27 (2024), NEA's 2022 cybersecurity measures, NEA's 2023 key requirements (section 19.2), the IEC webstore abstracts of IEC 61400-25-1/-2/-3/-4, and the Chinese standard records of GB/T 30966.1-2022, GB/T 36572-2018, GB/T 19963.1-2021 and GB/T 40607-2021 (texts not read). The 2015 overall protection scheme (国能安全〔2015〕36号) could not be retrieved from an official site and is not cited; the repealed 2014 Order No. 14 is mentioned only as the text the 2023 key requirements cite. No provincial grid-connection rule, inspection finding, incident report or vendor document is quoted. Not engineering, legal or security advice.